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Temporary Migration Programmes: The Problem of Compliance

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The Problem of Compliance

- Non-compliance of employers
 - Exploitation
 - Illegal employment
- Non-compliance of migrant workers
 - Overstay, illegal work
- Contribution of research
 - Understanding causes of non-compliance
 - Evaluating tools for 'steering' behaviour

Employers: Causes of Non-Compliance

- Shortage of labour supply
- Costs of switching employees
- Costs of legal employment
 - Wage, social contributions, employment conditions

Employers: Control Mechanisms

- Regulation
 - Employer sanctions
- Peer pressure
 - Naming and shaming
 - Public campaign
- Competition
 - Employee right to switch
- Design
 - Limit sectors
 - Black-listing

Migrant Workers: Causes of Prolonging Stay

- Macro variables
 - Economic disparities
 - Political conditions
- Household strategies
 - Change of plans (weakening ties)
 - Failure to meet savings target
- Ties to host country
 - Migrant networks
 - Relationships, life-style, affinity

Migrant Workers: Control Mechanisms

- Regulation
 - Deportation
 - Financial penalties (bonds, refunds)
- Peer pressure
 - Problematic....
- Competition
 - Financial return incentive
 - Portable pensions, savings schemes
- Design
 - Promote travel, circularity
 - Enable meeting of savings targets
 - Selection according to nationality, sector and skills

Conclusion

- Employers: regulation and peer pressure
- Workers: programme design
- Dilemma:
 - Politically and economically expedient policies
 - versus
 - Policies designed to maximise compliance